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Abstract
By using data from 8 depository institutions in Turkey we evaluate the drivers
of securitization between 2004 and 2009. Our analysis shows that previous period
securitization as well as bank equity, level of prots and asset size are important
factors in a bank's decision to securitize its loan portfolio. Banks' on-balance sheet
liquidity on the other hand is not a signicant factor. We also use a binary probit
model and predict with good certainty the timing of a bank's securitization in capital
markets. Again, bank size, protability and equity are also explanatory variables in
making these accurate predictions.
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1 Introduction
Securitization refers to the process of transforming illiquid assets with predictable cash
ows into marketable securities. The most common forms of assets used in securitization
are mortgage loans, consumer loans, credit card receipts and trade receivables. Although
asset securitization has been widespread in developed capital markets especially prior to
the Global Financial Crisis, it has constituted an unknown frontier for emerging market
banks until recently. The rst Turkish bank successfully sold its trade receivables portfolio
in international capital markets in 1999. 1 However due to interruption by the 2001-2002
banking crisis securitization did not catch on in the Turkish banking system well until
2003-2004.
In this paper we study the securitization activity in the Turkish banking system be-
tween 2004 and 2009 using a dataset of eight Turkish banks which have successfully sold
their loan portfolios in international markets during this time frame. We estimate the
drivers of their securitization activity by using a GMM specication and nd that previous
period securitization activity, bank's prot and equity holdings are the key determinants
in terms of their decision to securitize or not. Surprisingly, liquidity does not appear to
be a driver of securitization. We also run probit estimations for each bank to see if we
can predict the probability of securitization. Our estimation results suggest the factors
we have found to be inuential in our GMM estimation also predict the probability of
securitization activity by each bank.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we provide a brief
overview of literature on determinants of securitization; in Section 3 we present our
methodology; in Section 4 we describe our dataset; Section 5 provides the results of
our estimations and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
To our knowledge there is no prior study that studies securitization by the Turkish banking
system in the growing securitization literature. Yet studies on emerging markets have been
done before, some of which may also include Turkey. For instance Jobst (2010) provides
a good critical survey of sovereign securitization in emerging markets but this study does
not cover bank-level securitization.
There are many reasons for banks to engage in securitization and a vast literature that
1Garanti Bank raised approximately $200 million in a securitization deal led by Bank of America's
securitization team in London.
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discusses these. The obvious rst reason is to increase liquidity: Securitization creates a
funding opportunity for banks without having to attract more retail deposits and being
subject to deposit insurance and reserve requirements ((Parlour and Plantin 2008)). A
second benet is it enables a transfer of credit risk. As argued by Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and
Laeven (2008) banks with riskier loans may securitize more than others as a result. A
third determinant refers to accounting gains(e.g. (DeMarzo 2005)).
When market value of loans exceed their book values, banks may have more of an
incentive to recognize these gains. And a nal incentive for banks to securitize their
loan portfolios may be the opportunity to adjust their capital ratios and decrease their
regulatory requirements as Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995) and Jones (2000) have
suggested.
as argued by Anito and Tagliaferri (2010) these eects could also be linked to each
other . For instance, if the goal of securitization for a bank is to release capital and use
the proceeds to engage in more protable investments, the causal eect will be signicant
for both capital and prots. However, the eects could also be completely independent of
each other. In that regard, we observe that it is mostly well-capitalized banks in Turkey
rather than the smaller ones that securitize but at the same time banks can increase
capital even if they have high prots too.
3 Methodology
Our aim is to identify the drivers of securitization activity for Turkish banks, in other
words the factors which prompt them to securitize their loan portfolios in international
markets. We set up our empirical specication for estimation as follows:
Si;t = i + 1Si;t 1 + 2equityi;t + 3profiti;t + 4tai;t + 5bi;t + " (3.1)
where Si;t represents securitized loans for bank i at time t; equity represents bank equity;
profit is bank prots before taxes and ta is our size measure which represents total assets;
bit is a measure of balance sheet liquidity calculated by the sum of due from other banks,
marketable securities and cash on a bank's balance sheet and nally " is the error term.
All our variables are in real terms.
We estimate equation (3.1) using a dynamic GMM model to control for potential endo-
geneity of the regressors as some factors inuencing securitization can also be inuencing
protability and total assets.
As a second level of our analysis, we also evaluate the prediction capability of the
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variables in Eq.(3.1) in determining the securitization decision made by individual banks
in our sample. To do so we estimated a probit model for the individual banks in our
sample. Our probit estimation takes the following form:
Di;t = i + 1equityi;t + 2profiti;t + 3tai;t + 4bi;t + "it (3.2)
where Di;t takes the value of 1 if bank i securitized in quesrter t and 0 otherwise; the other
variables are the same as dened before and nally "it is a mean zero, constant variance
disturbance term, assumed to be normally distributed.
The probit model is dened as:
Pr(Yi = 1jxi; ) = 1  ( x0i) = (x
0
i); (3.3)
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The basic idea is to
relate this equation to the existence of an underlying latent variable y that is linearly
related to x:
yi = x
0
i + ui; (3.4)
where u is a normally distributed random term. The dependent variable is determined by
whether yi exceeds a threshold value:
2
yi =
8<:1; if yi > 00; if yi  0: (3.5)
4 Data
Our banking and securitization data for the Turkish banking system is obtained from
Turkish Banks Association. It includes 8 depository institutions that have successfully
issued securities in international markets during the ve and a half year period of quarterly
data that covers 2004 to the second quarter of 2009. These banks represent the biggest
banking institutions in Turkey with assets totaling over 80% of the overall assets of the
system. The banks in the sample also have a loan portfolio of 14.5 billion TL and a total
asset average of 29.7 billion TL. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our sample.
The average securitization level per bank per quarter is around 468 million TL or 312
mil USD adjusted for ination and only constitutes about 3% of average loan holdings by
2For example, in this paper we will call y = 1 if there was securitization activity and, y = 0 if there
was no securitization.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
b S equity loans prot ta
Mean 5,154,020.00 468,000.1 3,586,080.00 14,557,726.00 403,930.80 29,678,026
Median 3,404,195.00 384,496.1 3,212,354.00 11,802,515.00 308,857.10 28,038,141
Maximum 21,283,921.00 1,206,879 8,755,292.00 33,492,278.00 1,674,449.00 73,041,103
Minimum 248,156.00 28,770.44 567,982.30 2,016,517.00 -2,213,927.00 3,134,899
Std. Dev. 4,520,063.00 289,913.2 2,391,983.00 8,608,049.00 408,914.90 19,322,469
Skewness 1.43 0.85 0.57 0.62 -0.74 0.37
Kurtosis 4.38 3.12 2.02 2.17 12.34 1.94
Observations 168 31 168 168 168 168
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. All variables are in terms of thousand Turkish Liras and are adjusted for ination by
deating each series by the cpi. The number of banks in the study is 8. S is the total securitization amount by the bank in each quarter in
terms of Turkish Liras. b represents on-balance sheet liquidity, and is measured by summing up bank's cash, due from other banks and total
marketable securities; equity represents shareholders' equity; loans represents banks' overall loan portfolio; profit is banks' prot before
taxes; ta represents bank's total assets
banks during the period. This ratio is number is much below the same for more developed
economies(In the US at the end of 2007, the ratio of securitized loans to outstanding loans
stood at around 27% for consumer credit, and at 2.6% for loans to business (Loutskina
2010).)
Figure 1 shows the level of securitization activity versus the real gdp for the years
under analysis. As can be seen there is a direct and strong correlation between the two
variables(with a correlation coecient of ..........) We do not observe the same high type of
strong correlation when we evaluate securitization with respect to liquidity in the system.
Figure 2 shows the banks' on-balance sheet liquidity versus their securitization activity
during the study period. We can observe that until 2007 both variables increased at the
same time while after 2007 there is an inverse relationship between the two variables.
It is also evident from Figure 3 that bank size is closely correlated with securitization
activity. This gure shows the level of securitization during the sample period versus the
size of the bank measured in terms of total assets. As can be observed on the gure, banks
that rank higher in terms of their assets in the sample(bank rankings are listed next to
the alphabetical code assigned to each bank in the sample) also have higher securitization
activity during the sample period suggesting that bigger banks have the necessary means
and resources to take on securitization activity in international markets.
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Figure 1: Securitization Activity versus Real GDP
The gure shows the total securitization activity for the group of 8 banks in our sample that have securitized during the study period versus
the Turkish real GDP. Securitization amounts are adjusted for ination.Source: CBRT and Turkish Banks Association
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Figure 2: Securitization Activity versus Liquidity
The gure shows the total securitization activity for the group of 8 banks in our sample that have securitized during the study period versus
the liquidity in the system. All gures are adjusted for ination.Source: CBRT and Turkish Banks Association
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Figure 3: Securitization Activity versus Liquidity
The gure shows the total securitization activity for the group of 8 banks in our sample that have securitized during the study period versus
the size of the banks. The values in paranthesis indicate the letter assigned to the bank as well as the rank of the bank in terms of assets. All
gures are adjusted for ination.Source: CBRT and Turkish Banks Association
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Table 2: Unit Root Tests
Level Series First Dierence Series
t-ADF t-ADF
S 72:7537 174:858
b 27:4485 142:253
equity 6.29631 92:1601
prot 83:8328 127:417
ta 11.2350 102:154
trlibor 7:60862 134:294
This table presents the ADF test results foer all variables in our dataset. The variables
are in real terms.S is the total securitization amount by the bank in each quarter in terms
of Turkish Liras. b represents liquidity, and is measured by summing up bank's cash, due
from other banks and total marketable securities; equity represents shareholders' equity;
profit is bank's prot before taxes; ta represents bank's total assets and trlibor is the
quarterly average of the Turkish lira interbank lending rate. * , ** and *** denote rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis of unit root at, 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
Lags are chosen using Schwarz criterion.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 GMM Estimation
First, we checked for the stationarity of our dataset and nd that prot, liquidity and
securitization are non-stationary in levels. However, all the non-stationary variables are
stationary in rst dierence. The results of the ADF-Fisher unit root tests for stationarity
of the data are reported in Table 2. The lag structure was determined using the Schwarz
criterion. We thus estimate our Equation (3.1) using the series in dierences.
As noted by Arellano and Bond (1991) if we include a lag of the endogenous variable
as an explanatory variable, the results of the Fixed Eect model will be biased and
inconsistent. Thus, for the specication presented 3.1 we use the GMM model following
the technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As suggested by these authors
we use all possible lags of our dependent variable plus lagged values of all regressors as
instruments. In this way we obtain parameter estimates that are consistent and ecient.
We have 8 banks that we use in our dynamic panel GMM model. This number of cross
sections is not enough to insure consistency and eciency of our estimates. That's why
as a robustness check we performed two additional econometric specications: panel xed
eects and Two-Stage-Least -Squares.The coecient estimates of both models are very
similar as well as their standard errors. These results somewhat support the consistency
9
and eciency of our estimates using the GMM. 3
Table 3 provides the results of our estimation using specication (3.1). As can be seen
changes in bank equity, prots, total asset and previous period securitization activity
are all important drivers of securitization. We observe that securitization activity in
the previous period has a signicant and persistent negative eect on the amount of
securitization banks undertake in each quarter. The coecient of this variable ranges from
-0.57 to -0.63 suggesting that an increase of 1 million Turkish liras in bank securitization
activity in the previous period decreases a bank's need to securitize in the current period by
almost 600 thousand liras. The coecient of the equity variable is also highly signicant
and also negative suggesting that as banks increase their equity levels their need for
securitization also decreases. Although the coecient of this variable is not as high as
the change in the level of previous period securitization(ranges from -0.22 to -0.28), it
suggests that an increase of 10 million Turkish liras in bank equity levels decreases the
amount securitized by the banks in the current period by 2.5 million liras.We also observe
that increase in prots or bank's total assets decrease their need to securitize further
highlighting the importance of strong balance sheets and bank eciency in securitization
activity. However, the insignicance of the bank liquidity variable(b) is worth mentioning.
This suggests that banks' liquidity positions are not necessarily a key factor in explaining
their securitization activity.
5.2 Probit Estimation
The results of our probit estimations for the banks in our sample are presented in Table 4.
We do not use the actual securitization amounts but a dummy variable instead. McFadden
R square and Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistics are also presented.
3Results are available upon request.
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Table 3: Determinants of Securitization
Dep. Variable: Securitization
Time Period 2004q3-2009q2
C  2374:956 19140:89 24078:30 2022:59 1585:78
(20197.33) (19832.29) (19679.11) (22554.51) (22587.92)
St 1  0:632  0:616  0:595  0:578  0:571
(0.060) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
equity  0:227  0:278  0:284  0:283
(0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
prot 0:128 0:128 0:125
(0.056) (0.055) (0.057)
ta 0:023 0:022
(0.012) (0.012)
b 0:011
(0.014)
Adj:R2 0.415 0.473 0.488 0.497 0.496
Numberofobs: 152 152 152 152 152
J   Statistic 26.478 11.749 6.891 3.238 2.580
SarganTestPvalue 0.0001 0.0383 0.1417 0.3563 0.2751
All variables are adjusted for ination by deating each series by the cpi. Due to the existence of unit roots in our data series, we use the
rst dierence of all variables in our specication. S is the total securitization amount by the bank in each quarter in terms of Turkish Liras.
equity represents shareholders' equity; profit is bank's prot before taxes and ta represents bank's total assets and b represents liquidity, and
is measured by summing up bank's cash, due from other banks and total marketable securities. The Sargan test p-value shows the probability
of the the null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are valid. * signicant at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at
1 percent.
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We checked for the goodness-of-t of our model using the Hosmer-Lemeshow(HL) test.
This Pearson 2-type test has as a null that the model provides sucient t to the data.
We accept the null hypothesis in all specications suggesting that our model had a good
t for our analysis. We observe equity has a negative and signicant impact in explaining
bank securitization for the ve of the banks in our sample (Banks A through E). The sign
of this variable is also worth mentioning. The negative coecient of this variable suggests
as bank equity increases in real terms banks' probability to securitize their loans decrease.
This nding conrms the results of our GMM estimation reported in Table 3 and also
supports previous research ndings in literature regarding the behavior of banks in more
developed economies. In that regard, we observe that Turkish banks behave similarly as
banks in more developed systems that have a longer history of securitization.
Another variable that takes on an expected sign in our ndings is the prot variable.
As was the case in the GMM estimations, in our probit estimations we observe that
prot level inuences a banks' securitization decision. Although in only two of the probit
estimations the prot variable has a signicant positive coecient, we can say that banks
that are more protable are more likely to securitize their loan portfolios.
Our estimations also rearm our expectations that as banks' balance sheet liquidity
increases their likelihood of securitizing decreases. The liquidity variable(b) takes on a
negative and signicant coecient for two of the seven banks for which we were able to
run a probit estimation.
Our model can correctly predict securitization decision for four out of the seven banks
in our sample(Due to interruptions in the dataset, we cannot perform probit estimations
for Bank H in our sample). The percentage gains of using our model versus a model
that only includes the constant (meaning that the probability of securitization equals the
empirical probability) is equal to 50%, 33.3%, 40% and 50% for Banks A, C, E and F
in our sample. (see Table 5) In the case of Bank A, our model can predict three out of
the six times the bank successfully sold its securitization portfolio in international capital
markets, in the case of Bank C this ratio is only one out of three; two out of ve in the
case of E and four out of eight in the case of F. We do not observe any gain in terms of
the prediction capability of our model in the cases of the remaining 3 banks for which
we were able to run a probit estimation. Yet, we believe this is due to the low number
of securitization transactions these banks have had during the sample period. Bank B
has a securitization frequency of 3 out of 21 quarters(14%), while for banks G and D,
this ratio is even lower at 1 out of 21(4.7%) and 2 out of 21(9.5%) respectively. In all
the remaining banks for which we were able to see a percentage gain of our model over
the constant probability function, this ratio is signicantly higher.(For Bank A, 6 out of
13
21 quarters(28.6%), for Bank E 5 out of 21 quarters(23%), and for Bank F 8 out of 21
quarters(38%))
Table 5: Prediction Tables For Securitization of Loans
Bank A Bank B
Est. Eq. Const.Prob. Est. Eq. Const. Prob.
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Total 15 6 15 6 18 3 18 3
Correct 14 3 15 0 18 0 18 0
% Correct 93.33% 50% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
% Incorrect 6.67% 50% 0% 100% 0% 100% 100% 0%
Percent Gain NA 50% 0%
Bank C Bank D
Est. Eq. Const.Prob. Est. Eq. Const. Prob.
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Total 18 3 18 3 20 1 20 1
Correct 17 1 18 0 20 0 20 0
% Correct 94.44% 33.33% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0%
% Incorrect 5.56% 66.67% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100%
Percent Gain NA 33.33% NA 0%
Bank E Bank F
Est. Eq. Const.Prob. Est. Eq. Const. Prob.
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Total 16 5 16 5 13 8 13 8
Correct 16 2 16 0 11 4 13 0
% Correct 100% 40% 100% 0% 84.62% 50% 100% 0%
% Incorrect 0% 60% 0% 100% 15.38% 50% 0% 100%
Percent Gain NA 40% NA 50%
Bank G
Est. Eq. Const.Prob.
0 1 0 1
Total 19 2 19 2
Correct 19 0 19 0
% Correct 100% 0% 100% 0%
% Incorrect 0% 100% 0% 100%
Percent Gain NA 0%
This table shows the predictions of the probit estimations on the probability of securitization decision by Turkish
Banks versus the Constant Probability Function. The cuto point is 0.5. The value 1 represents loan securitization
by the bank and 0 the case of no securitization. The column \Est. Eq." lists the predictions by the probit
function; the column \Constant Probability" lists the predicted values of the constant probability estimation. The
improvement in estimations using the probit function are given in the \Percent Gain" line. We cannot estimate a
probit function for Bank H in our sample due to missing data values for this bank.
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6 Conclusion
Although it has been more than 10 years since the rst Turkish bank has successfully sold
its outstanding loan portfolio in international capital markets, the securitization market
constitutes a relatively small portion of the the total credit market in the Turkey. However
securitization is a growing area for Turkish banks and also for researchers that work on
emerging markets. By using data from the Turkish Banks Association, in this paper
we estimated the determinants of securitization during the 2004-2009 period in Turkey.
We believe our research contributes to the current debate on securitization in emerging
markets by being one of the rst on this issue with focus on Turkey.
Our results suggest that previous period securitization, bank size, protability level
and equity are key determinants of a bank's decision to securitize in the Turkish case. The
most important determinant in our estimations, the level of previous period securitization
carries a negative coecient suggesting Turkish banks are inuenced to a great degree in
determining how much of their loan portfolio to securitize by the amount they securitized
in the previous quarter. Another interesting result of our ndings suggest that bigger
banks are more likely to securitize their loan portfolios in the Turkish case. We also ran
probit estimations for each bank in our sample to see if we can predict the probability of
securitization on a bank basis. Results of binary probit estimations suggest the factors
we have found to be inuential in our GMM estimation also predict the probability of
securitization activity by each bank. This nding rearms results obtained in the GMM
analysis with percentage gains in terms of prediction capability in four out of the seven
banks in our sample over a constant probability model.
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Appendix
Table 6: Banks in the sample(Alphabetical)
Bank Name Ownership Group (as of 2010) Total Assets as of 2010Q3(mil USD)
A Non-state owned - Domestic 72,460.13
B Non-state owned - Domestic 17,204.37
C Non-state owned - Foreign 23,454.34
D Non-state owned - Foreign 10,597.03
E Non-state owned - Domestic 86,482.10
F Non-state owned - Domestic 78,635.06
G State owned - Domestic 49,958.55
H Non-state owned - Domestic 51,405.33
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey
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Figure 4: Securitization Activity versus Loans
The gure shows the securitization activity for the group of 8 banks in our sample that have securitized during the study period. All gures
in in terms of 1000 Turkish liras.
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